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I.

INTRODUCTION

“We are asking for your help to hold these people accountable for
their actions.”1 These are the words of an Indiana resident who stood
before legislators and petitioned them to criminalize revenge porn. 2 Her
decision to speak out came after she fell victim to revenge porn at the

*Haley McCleary, J.D., UIC School of Law 2022. Thank you to my friends and family
for their love and support throughout my law school journey. A special thank you to
my dad and Denise Luna for always taking my late-night calls and helping me
overcome spells of writer’s block. Finally, thank you to the Law Review staff for their
time and guidance throughout this process.
1. Kevin, Rader, Lawmakers hear emotional testimony from revenge porn victim,
WTHR (Feb. 19, 2019), www.wthr.com/article/news/local/lawmakers-hearemotional-testimony-revenge-porn-victim/531-a36f7d38-bf92-482e-846f79db34d9e5aa [perma.cc/P45F-XNDT].
2. Id. This Indiana resident, who asked to remain nameless, stood before the
Indiana House on February 19, 2019, and provided personal testimony about the
trauma she experienced as a revenge porn victim. Id. As an Indiana resident, a mother,
and teacher, this brave advocate served as a close to home example as to why Indiana
needed to criminalize revenge porn. Id.
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hands of her ex-husband.3 She explained to legislatures that police did all
that they could, but “there was no law [her] ex had broken.” 4 Moved by
this woman’s personal account of the trauma of revenge porn, the Indiana
House unanimously passed Indiana’s distribution of an intimate image
statute, Ind. Code §35-45-4-8.5 However, a recent Indiana case, Indiana v.
Katz,6 threatened the hard work of legislators and revenge porn victim
advocates.
In Katz, a Trine University student distributed a sexually explicit
video of another student, his then-girlfriend, via Snapchat.7 This video
was not only distributed without the victim’s consent, but she was also
unaware that the video was taken.8 The victim learned of the video’s
existence after the recipient of the video texted her three days later and
informed the victim of what she had received.9 The victim then retained
an attorney and went to the police.10
In May 2020, Conner Katz was charged with a Class A misdemeanor
under Indiana’s revenge porn statute, Ind. Code §35-35-4-8.11 However,
Katz’s case was later dismissed after a Steuben County Magistrate ruled
Indiana’s revenge porn statute was “unconstitutionally overbroad” and
thus ran afoul of the First Amendment.12 The State then filed a direct
appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court.13 Indiana, and the rest of the legal
community, anxiously awaited the Indiana Supreme Court’s ruling. In fact,
before the Indiana Supreme Court ruled, the fate of Indiana’s revenge
porn statute was so uncertain that the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative 14 had
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative and Dr. Mary Anne Franks
in Support of Appellant at 22, Indiana v. Conner Katz, No. 20S-CR-00632 (Ind. filed Nov.
4, 2020) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief]. The formal name of IND. CODE §35-45-4-8
is, “Distribution of an intimate image.” IND. CODE. ANN. §35-45-4-8 (West 2019).
However, this section is commonly referred to as Indiana’s “revenge porn” statute or
“nonconsensual pornography” statute due to the conduct it criminalizes. Brief for the
Appellant at 13, Indiana v. Katz, No. 20S-CR-00632 (Ind. filed Nov. 4, 2020). Thus, for
the remainder of this comment, I will often refer to IND. CODE. ANN. §35-45-4-8 (West
2019) as “Indiana’s revenge porn statute.”
6. Indiana v. Katz, No. 20S-CR-00632 (Ind. argued June 24, 2021).
7. Mike Marturello, Indiana’s revenge porn law rule unconstitutional in Steuben case,
HERALD REPUBLICAN (Nov. 6, 2020), www.kpcnews.com/heraldrepublican/
article_d67bfc4b-6dec-5d62-bf53-5d8b57b63590.html [perma.cc/K37H-JYUC].
8. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 5, at 9.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Indiana v. Katz, No. 20S-CR-00632 (Ind. argued June 24, 2021).
14. “Cyber Civil Rights Initiative is the leading U.S.-based non-profit organization
addressing the growing problem of unauthorized distribution of intimate images.”
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 5, at 10. “CCRI’s board includes the two foremost legal
experts on nonconsensual pornography in the United States, Dr. Mary Anne Franks
(President) . . . and Danielle Keats Citron (Vice-President).” Id. Together, Dr. Franks and
Citron co-authored “the first law review article on the criminalization of ‘revenge porn’
in 2014.” Id. Dr. Franks has also authored “the first model criminal statute on
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joined forces with the State and filed an amicus brief in support of
Indiana’s statute.15 The Cyber Civil Rights Initiative (“CCRI”) feared that
“if the ruling [of the Steuben Court] [was] left to stand, Indiana [would]
become the first state to go backwards on this issue.” 16 Thankfully, on
January 18, 2022, the Indiana Supreme Court issued their opinion,
reversing the Steuben County Magistrate’s ruling that the statute was
unconstitutional, and thus saving Indiana’s revenge porn statute.17
This Comment will argue that Indiana’s revenge porn statute is
constitutional and thus the Indiana Supreme Court made the correct
decision in its ruling. Part II will define revenge porn, describe the impact
technology and the Internet has had on it, as well as explain the harms
revenge porn has on its victims. Additionally, this section will provide a
glimpse of Indiana’s statute, Ind. Code §35-34-4-8, and the United States
Supreme Court precedent which guides First Amendment analysis. Part
III will explain the various approaches the Indiana Supreme Court could
have taken when analyzing the constitutionality of Indiana’s revenge
porn statutes. Part IV will explain the proper analysis that the Indiana
Supreme Court applied and why the court correctly addressed the
constitutionality of Indiana’s revenge porn statute. Lastly, Part V will
briefly conclude and reemphasize the importance of Indiana’s revenge
porn statute.

II.

BACKGROUND

A. Revenge Porn – What is it?
Nonconsensual pornography involves the distribution of sexually
explicit pictures or videos of an individual without their consent.18 “This
includes images originally obtained without consent (e.g., hidden
recordings or recordings of sexual assaults) as well as images originally
obtained with consent, usually within the context of a private or
confidential relationship.” 19 The term “revenge porn” has become a
popular shorthand for nonconsensual pornography.20 Consequently, the
nonconsensual pornography in 2012, which has been used as a template for many of
the 48 U.S. jurisdictions that now criminalize this form of abuse and for the federal
Stopping Harmful Image Exploitation and Limiting Distribution (SHIELD) Act, now
part of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2021.” Id.
15. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 5, at 22.
16. Id.
17. State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431, 439 (Ind. 2022).
18. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014).
19. Id. (demonstrating that the term “revenge porn” is frequently used as
shorthand for all forms of nonconsensual pornography and therefore electing to use
the term revenge porn interchangeably with the term nonconsensual pornography).
20. State v. VanBuren, 214 A.3d 791, 794 (Vt. 2019) (“Revenge porn is a popular
label describing a subset of nonconsensual pornography published for vengeful
purposes.”).
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two terms are often used interchangeably.21 However, this practice has
become controversial as some find the term “revenge porn” to be too
limiting.22
Courts and nonconsensual pornography victim advocates argue that
the use of the term “revenge porn” is misleading, specifically because of
the connotation that there must be a vengeful motive.23 While revenge is
a common reason for the distribution of nonconsensual pornography, it
is just one reason a perpetrator might share sexually explicit images. 24 In
addition to revenge, “perpetrators may also be motivated by a desire for
profit, notoriety, entertainment, or for no specific reason at all.”25
Therefore, the term nonconsensual pornography is more encompassing
and thus more clearly covers all situations where sexually explicit images
are shared without consent.26
However, because of its widespread use, the term “revenge porn”
will be used interchangeably with nonconsensual pornography
throughout this Comment. Its use is not to refer to a subsection of
nonconsensual pornography, but instead as shorthand.

B. The Evolution of Revenge Porn
The exchange of sexually explicit images is not a new concept for
society. Throughout history, people have exchanged sexually explicit
images through media available to them.27 However, as technology and
the Internet have advanced, the ability to take and share sexually explicit
images has rapidly evolved. With the development of the smartphone,
people are now equipped with a camera and the Internet at their
fingertips.28 With this power in the peoples’ pockets, society has seen
nonconsensual pornography become increasingly common and sinister.29
21. Id.
22. Mary Anne Franks, "Revenge Porn" Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA.
L. REV. 1251, 1257 (2017).
23. See e.g., id. at 1257 (describing “revenge porn” as misleading); People v. Austin,
2019 IL 123910, ¶18, 155 N.E.3d 439, 451 (Ill. 2019) (explaining how the term revenge
porn “obscures the gist of the crime.”); State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629, n7 (Minn.
2020) (explaining that the term “revenge porn” is misleading).
24. Katherine Gabriel, Feminist Revenge: Seeking Justice for Victims of
Nonconsensual Pornography Through “Revenge Porn” Reform, 44 VT. L. REV. 849, 852
(2020).
25. Franks, supra note 22, at 1258.
26. Id.
27. Aviva Majerczyk, A Brief, Dirty History of Sexting, LINK (Mar. 5, 2019),
www.thelinknewspaper.ca/article/a-brief-dirty-history-of-sexting [perma.cc/LXA83X4G]. The exchange of sexually explicit images can be traced back as far as the 17th
Century. Id. King Charles II was known to commission “nude paintings of his long-time
mistress.” Id. The invention of the camera simplified the process of capturing of
sexually explicit images; specifically, the Polaroid which provided “unparalleled
intimacy.” Id.
28. Id.
29. Charlotte Alter, ‘It’s Like Having an Incurable Disease’: Inside the Fight Against
Revenge Porn, TIME (June 13, 2017), www.time.com/4811561/revenge-porn/
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Perpetrators can now not only send sexually explicit images via text or
email, but can also publish them on the Internet or on social media to
“crowdsource abuse” and even potentially profit from it.30
A 2014 study revealed that as many as 3,000 websites featured
nonconsensual pornography. 31 Just three years later, that number had
already increased to as many as 10,000. 32 This problem has not gone
away. More recently, in June 2021, dozens of women sued Pornhub
alleging that the website had profited from their nonconsensual
pornography.33 Nonconsensual porn websites continue to grow in
popularity due to the anonymity they offer perpetrators.34 Some are
particularly disturbing as they not only post the sexually explicit images
but will also include a victim’s personal information.35
Social media has also been a driving force in the spread of
nonconsensual pornography. For years, social media platforms did not
devote resources to combating the spread of nonconsensual porn. 36
However, after pressure from Mary Anne Franks, a top legal advocate for
revenge porn reform, social media platforms have begun to take action. 37
In 2015, Reddit, Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, Microsoft, Google, along
with others, finally instituted a ban on nonconsensual pornography and
implemented reporting procedures.38 While these policies and
procedures are essential to the regulation of nonconsensual
pornography, a notable shortcoming is that many social media platforms
do not proactively flag these images.39 Therefore, by the time a
[perma.cc/T5GV-CX95].
30. Franks, supra note 22, at 1261.
31. Id.
32. Id. The author of this article, Dr. Mary Anne Franks, indicated that this figure is
based on the number of takedown requests which were available to the Cyber Civil
Rights Initiative. Id.
33. Moira Ritter, Pornhub sued for allegedly serving nonconsensual sex videos, CNN
BUSINESS (June 18, 2021), www.cnn.com/2021/06/17/tech/pornhub-lawsuitfiled/index.html [perma.cc/U77H-MC3K] (“The civil complaint alleges that Pornhub
parent company MindGeek, one of the largest online pornography companies, is a
“classic criminal enterprise” with a business structure created to monetize
nonconsensual sexual content.”).
34. Christian Nisttáhuz, Fifty States of Gray: A Comparative Analysis of "RevengePorn" Legislation Throughout the United States and Texas's Relationship Privacy Act, 50
TEX. TECH L. REV. 333, 336 (2018).
35. Aaron Minc & Alexandra Arko, How to Permanently Remove Content From
Revenge Porn Websites, MINC (Sept. 24, 2020), www.minclaw.com/remove-postsrevenge-porn-websites/ [perma.cc/8JB5-U8ZP].
36. Franks, supra note 22, at 1270.
37. Id.
38. How To Report Revenge Porn on Social Media, C.A. GOLDBERG VICTIMS’ RIGHTS LAW
FIRM,
www.cagoldberglaw.com/how-to-report-revenge-porn-on-social-media/
[perma.cc/37AQ-AZU6] (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
39. Franks, supra note 22, at 1273. The CCRI strongly advocates for social media
platforms to implement preventative measures. Id. The CCRI proposes that this be
done through the use of a technology called PhotoDNA. (PhotoDNA, “calculates the
particular characteristics of a given digital image—its digital fingerprint or ‘hash
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nonconsensual pornography victim discovers their image has been
posted, screenshot, shared, or saved, and they request its removal, “it may
have already been downloaded, forwarded and posted by hundreds or
even thousands of users.”40
Even with many social media platforms implementing bans on
nonconsensual pornography, the spread of these sexually explicit images
is still a huge issue on social media. For example, in 2017, after Facebook’s
ban on nonconsensual pornography, Facebook still assessed nearly
52,000 potential cases of revenge porn.41 Furthermore, many
nonconsensual pornography cases have originated from Snapchat. 42
Snapchat presents unique challenges when it comes to regulating
nonconsensual pornography.43 This is a direct result of Snapchat’s “delete
is our default” concept.44 On Snapchat, all images are automatically
deleted after being viewed by the recipients.45 However, there is always
the potential that someone could screenshot an image or save it using
another form of technology before the image is deleted.46 While victims
of nonconsensual pornography do have the option to “report abuse on
Snapchat,” the harm has already occurred.

value’—to match it to other copies of that same image”…images are then given
signatures, “those signatures can be shared with online service provides, who can
match them against the hashes of photos on their own services, find copies of the same
photos and remove them.”) (quoting New Technology Fights Child Porn by Tracking its
“PhotoDNA”, MICROSOFT, news.microsoft.com/2009/12/15/new-technology-fightschild-porn-by-tracking-its-photodna [perma.cc/Z86T-TG7M] (last visited Oct. 10,
2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).)
40. Id.
41. Nicole Hopkins & Olivia Solon, Facebook flooded with ‘sextortion’ and ‘revenge
porn’,
files
reveal,
GUARDIAN
(May
2,
2017),
www.theguardian.
com/news/2017/may/22/facebook-flooded-with-sextortion-and-revenge-pornfiles-reveal [perma.cc/D28K-JC84] (“Facebook had to assess nearly 54,000 potential
cases of revenge pornography and ‘sextortion’ on the site in a single month.”).
42. See generally Indiana v. Katz, No. 20S-CR-00632 (Ind. argued June 24, 2021)
(depicting a case of revenge porn where the distribution of a sexually explicit video
was done via Snapchat); Nisttáhuz, supra note 34, at 334 (describing a revenge porn
case which arose from a sexually explicit image captured and distributed via
Snapchat); Claire Lampen, Snapchat Sexting is Being Used As A Vehicle for Revenge Porn
– and It’s Hard to Stop, MIC (Feb. 24, 2016), www.mic.com/articles/136070/snapchatsexting-is-still-a-vehicle-for-revenge-porn-here-s-why-it-s-impossible-to-stop
[perma.cc/9HC3-VEYW] (explaining that there is a “sea of revenge porn sites sourcing
material from Snapchat.”).
43. Nisttáhuz, supra note 34, at 334.
44. When does Snapchat delete Snaps and Chats?, SNAPCHAT SUPPORT,
support.snapchat.com/en-US/article/when-are-snaps-chats-deleted
[perma.cc/AA72-26V2] (last visited Oct. 10, 2021) (breaking down into categories the
multiple ways in which users may communicate on Snapchat and at what point those
messages get deleted by Snapchat servers).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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C. Revenge Porn – Who it Harms and How
Society has seen highly publicized cases of nonconsensual
pornography including those involving public figures like Kim
Kardashian, Rihanna, Dave Portnoy, and even mass collections like
Celebgate47. However, the harmful spread of nonconsensual pornography
is in no way limited to celebrities. Social media has made it possible for
“any person to be dragged before the eyes of the world.”48 A startling
statistic revealed that “4% of internet users–one in 25 online Americans–
have either had sensitive images posted without their permission or had
someone threaten to post photos of them.”49 For women under thirty, that
number rose to one in ten.50
While victims can try to have their images removed from the
Internet, their efforts are usually met with little to no avail. “[T]he internet
is permanent.”51 Thus, it is nearly impossible to guarantee that an image
removed from one site has not already been shared or saved elsewhere.52
One nonconsensual pornography victim explained that the effects of
revenge porn are, “humiliating, degrading, and life-altering.”53 Another
nonconsensual pornography victim stated that it was “like having an
incurable disease;” it never goes away.54
Consequently, victims often internalize shame and worry about who
has viewed their images.55 A study conducted by CCRI revealed that
ninety-three percent of revenge porn victims experienced emotional
distress after the distribution of their intimate images.56 This emotional
distress typically manifests itself through “depression, anxiety,
47. “Celebgate” refers to the 2014 massive iCloud hack which resulted in hundreds
of celebrity nude photos being leaked online. Abby Ohlheiser, The shockingly simple
way the nude photos of ‘Celebgate’ were stolen, WASH. POST (May 24, 2016),
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/03/16/the-shockinglysimple-way-the-nude-photos-of-celebgate-were-stolen/ [perma.cc/UMP5-QKSX]. See
Department of Justice, Lancaster Man Pleads Guilty to Hacking Apple and Google E-Mail
Accounts Belonging To More Than 100 People, Mostly Celebrities, U.S. ATT’YS OFF. MIDDLE
DIST. PA. (May 24, 2016), www.justice.gov/usao-mdpa/pr/lancaster-man-pleadsguilty-hacking-apple-and-google-e-mail-accounts-belonging-more-100
[perma.cc/LNV9-GRK6] (explaining the criminal outcome of Celebgate).
48. Amber Heard, Amber Heard: Are We All Celebrities Now?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4,
2019),
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/opinion/amber-heard-revenge-porn.html
[perma.cc/3MB7-WV6V].
49. Amanda Lenhart et al., Nonconsensual Image Sharing: One in 25 Americans Has
Been A Victim Of “Revenge Porn”, DATA & SOC’Y (Dec. 13, 2016), www.datasociety.net/
blog/2016/12/13/nonconsensual-image-sharing/ [perma.cc/3W7W-WH55].
50. Id.
51. Alter, supra note 29.
52. Id.
53. Heard, supra note 48.
54. Alter, supra note 29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Citron & Franks, supra note 18, at 364.
56. Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, Power In Numbers, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE (Jan. 3,
2014), www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-infographic/ [perma.cc/24EZ-GMY7].
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agoraphobia, difficulty maintaining intimate relationships, and
posttraumatic stress disorder.”57 Additionally, a staggering fifty-one
percent of revenge porn victims reported suffering suicidal thoughts.58 In
the midst of dealing with the initial emotional trauma, nonconsensual
pornography victims are often fearful of becoming victims again.59 This
fear is not without cause, as forty-nine percent of victims reported being
“harassed or stalked online by users who saw their material.”60
In conjunction with their emotional turmoil, victims of
nonconsensual pornography also commonly face professional
challenges.61 As a result of their sexually explicit images being posted and
shared online, many victims have lost their jobs or struggle to find
employment.62 This is frequently a direct result of perpetrators posting a
victim’s identifying information alongside their sexually explicit images. 63
Thus, with a quick internet search, a victim’s chance at employment could
potentially be ruined. “The simple but regrettable truth is that after
consulting search results, employers don’t call revenge porn victims to
schedule interviews or to extend offers.”64 In the instance where a
nonconsensual pornography victim is able to keep their job, they still face
challenges in the workplace as they are forced to have uncomfortable
conversations with their bosses and co-workers.65

D. Indiana Attempts to Protect Hoosiers
In response to the growing concern for revenge porn, forty-eight
states, the District of Columbia, and Guam have enacted criminal revenge
porn statutes.66 Indiana’s revenge porn statute was unanimously passed
by state legislators in February 2019.67 The statute then became effective
on July 1, 2019.68 Indiana’s revenge porn statute provides:
(d) A person who:
(1) knows or reasonably should know that an individual depicted in an
intimate image does not consent to the distribution of the intimate
image; and

57. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 5, at 15.
58. Id.
59. Alix Iris Cohen, Nonconsensual Pornography and the First Amendment: A Case
for a New Unprotected Category of Speech, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 300, 340 (2015).
60. Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, supra note 56.
61. Citron & Franks, supra note 18, at 352.
62. Id.
63. Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, supra note 56.
64. Citron & Franks, supra note 18, at 352.
65. Alter, supra note 29.
66. Carter Chance, An Update on the Legal Landscape of Revenge Porn, NAT’L ASSOC.
ATT’YS
GEN.,
www.naag.org/attorney-general-journal/an-update-on-the-legallandscape-of-revenge-porn/ [perma.cc/MUU2-25UM] (last visited Feb. 25, 2022).
67. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 5, at 22.
68. IND. CODE. ANN. §35-45-4-8 (West 2019).
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(2) distributes the intimate image;
commits distribution of an intimate image, a Class A misdemeanor.
However, the offense is a Level 6 felony if the person has a prior unrelated
conviction under this section.

While Indiana lawmakers clearly intended to protect Hoosiers from
the distribution of nonconsensual pornography with the criminalization
of revenge porn, Indiana’s revenge porn statute was recently at risk. In
2020, a Steuben County Magistrate held that Indiana’s revenge porn
statute was “unconstitutionally overbroad” and in violation of the First
Amendment.69 That decision was reviewed by the Indiana Supreme Court
in the case, State v. Katz, and rightfully reversed on January 18, 2022. 70

E. Analyzing a First Amendment Challenge
Indiana’s revenge porn statute was not the first statute of its kind to
be challenged on First Amendment grounds. Revenge porn statutes
across the country have faced similar challenges from defendants who
claim revenge porn statutes run afoul the First Amendment. 71 The First
Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
provides, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”72 The government therefore “has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”73
However, First Amendment protection is not absolute.74 The United
States Supreme Court “has long recognized that the government may
regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the
Constitution.”75 These well-known categorical exceptions to full First
Amendment protection include: speech that incites imminent lawless
action, obscenity, defamation, fighting words, child pornography, true
threats, and speech presenting grave and imminent threat which the
government has the power to protect.76 When regulated speech falls
69. Marturello, supra note 7.
70. Katz, 179 N.E.3d at 439.
71. Evan Ribot, Revenge Porn and the First Amendment: Should Nonconsensual
Distribution of Sexually Explicit Images Receive Constitutional Protection?, 2019 U. CHI.
LEG. FORUM 521, 522 (2019).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievance.”). See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95
(1940).
73 Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791-2 (2011) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Am. C.L Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Ashcroft v. Am. C.L. Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (explaining that although
the First Amendment reads “Congress shall make no law” that there are still situations
where regulations are appropriate).
75. Id. (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
76. See U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (internal citations omitted)
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outside these categorical exceptions, a court must then determine
whether the statute before it is content-neutral or content-based.77 Based
on that determination, a court may then apply the appropriate level of
scrutiny.
The principle inquiry in determining whether a statute is contentbased or content-neutral is understanding the government’s purpose for
the regulation.78 Government regulation is content-neutral when the
restriction is “justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.”79 A statute is still deemed content-neutral even if “it has an
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.” 80 When a
statute is determined to be content-neutral, the appropriate level of
scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny.81 Conversely, “[g]overnment regulation
of speech is content-based if a law applies to a particular speech because
of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”82 The Supreme
Court has consistently held that content-based restrictions are
“presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling
state interests.”83 Therefore, for a statute to survive under this heightened
level of scrutiny, the state must prove that there are no less restrictive
means to serve the government’s purpose.84

III.

ANALYSIS

In reviewing the constitutionality of Indiana’s revenge porn statute,
the Indiana Supreme Court first had to determine the appropriate First
Amendment analysis to apply.85 In doing so, the Indiana Supreme Court
looked at the speech Indiana’s statute regulated to determine the level of
First Amendment protection that speech should receive.86 The Indiana
Supreme Court ultimately concluded that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate analysis to apply to the statute.87 However, prior to the
(providing detailed Supreme Court rulings on categorical exceptions to the First
Amendment).
77. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (demonstrating that
when speech falls outside of the “well-understood exceptions” different levels of
scrutiny apply based on whether the regulation is content-neutral or content-based
and thus this must be determined before a level of scrutiny may be applied).
78. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty.
for Creative Non-Violence, 463 U.S. 288 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at
662 (applying O’Brien’s intermediate scrutiny test).
82. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Katz, 179 N.E.3d at 451-56 (analyzing which analysis Indiana’s revenge porn
statute should be reviewed under).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 455 (determining that Indiana’s revenge porn statute should be analyzed
under a strict scrutiny analysis because the statute “imposes a content-based
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court’s decision, it was difficult to predict which approach the Indiana
Supreme Court would take.88 This was largely due to the lack of
uniformity amongst state courts when analyzing the constitutionality of
their respective nonconsensual pornography statutes.89 An explanation
of the various approaches the Indiana Supreme Court could have taken
when analyzing the constitutionality of Indiana’s revenge porn statute
will be discussed in sections A through C.

A. Categorical Exceptions
As mentioned above, in section II-E, the United States Supreme Court
“has long recognized that the government may regulate certain categories
of expression consistent with the Constitution” and thus categorical
exceptions have been established.90 Therefore, if the Indiana Supreme
Court had determined that the speech regulated in Indiana’s revenge
porn statute was deserving of full First Amendment protection; the court
could have proceeded under a categorical exception analysis, such as
obscenity.
1.

Pre-Existing Categorical Exception – Is Nonconsensual
Pornography Obscene?

States have frequently argued that nonconsensual pornography is
obscene91 and thus should not receive full First Amendment protection. 92
restriction on protected speech.”).
88. Franks, supra note 22, at 1312.
89. Compare VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 800-01, 807-814 (applying strict scrutiny
analysis to Vermont’s revenge porn statute and acknowledging the arguments for
categorical exceptions), and Ex parte Ellis, 609 S.W.3d 332, 336-37 (Tex. Ct. App. 2020)
(holding Texas’s nonconsensual pornography statute is content-based and thus
deserving of strict scrutiny analysis), and Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 641 (applying strict
scrutiny analysis to Minnesota’s nonconsensual pornography statute), with Austin,
2019 IL 123910, ¶43, 155 N.E.3d at 457 (holding Illinois’s nonconsensual pornography
statute is subject to an intermediate scrutiny analysis and addressing categorical
exceptions).
90. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 573 (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted); Infra section II subsection E (listing the existing
categorical exceptions).
91. In the landmark case, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), the United
State Supreme Court “define[d] the standards that must be used to identify obscene
material that a State may regulate without infringing on the First Amendment.”
92. See e.g., VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 800-01 (analyzing the state’s argument that
Vermont’s nonconsensual pornography statute “categorically regulates obscenity and
is thus permissible under the First Amendment.”); Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 638-39
(addressing the state’s claim, and the district court’s holding, that Minnesota’s
nonconsensual pornography statute regulates unprotected obscene speech); Ex parte
Jones, No. 12-17-00340CR, 2018 WL 2228888 *4 (Tex. App. May 16, 2018) (analyzing
the state’s argument that Texas’s nonconsensual pornography statute regulates
“unprotected speech because it is contextually obscene.”).
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For speech to be considered obscene, a trier of fact must consider the
following principles provided by Miller v. California:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.93

Currently, all state courts who have applied Miller’s test to
nonconsensual pornography statutes have determined that the statutes
fail under the “patently offensive”94 prong.95 This is largely because the
type of images which nonconsensual pornography statutes seek to
regulate do not reach the patently offensive threshold.96 However, state
courts and legal scholars alike have acknowledged that the dissemination
of nonconsensual pornography could be considered “patently offensive”
although this concept falls outside of the “typical obscenity assessment.” 97
Thus, in order for the dissemination of nonconsensual pornography to
equate to obscenity, the categorical exception would need to be
expanded.98 Currently, no state court confronted with this issue has
elected to expand the contours of obscenity since the United States
Supreme Court has declined to do so.99
2.

Creating a New Categorical Exception

Rather than expanding a pre-existing categorical exception, the
Indiana Supreme Court could have also elected to create a new categorical
93. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
94. The United States Supreme Court has provided a few plain examples of what
constitutes patently offensive to “fix substantive constitutional limitations, deriving
from the First Amendment, on the type of material subject such a determination.”
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974). These examples include, “(a) [p]atently
offensive representation or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted,
actual or stimulated” and “(b) [p]atently offensive representation or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.” Id.
95. See e.g., VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 800-01 (holding that Vermont’s nonconsensual
pornography statute covers more speech than that which is “patently offensive.”);
Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 639 (explaining that there are situations when images shared
would not reach “patently offensive” but would fall under Minnesota’s statute).
96. VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 801. See also Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 161 (1974) (explaining
that “nudity alone is not enough to make material legally obscene under the Miller
Standards.”).
97. VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 800-01. See also Franks, supra note 22, at 1313-14
(explaining the challenges of classifying nonconsensual pornography as obscenity).
98. VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 800-01.
99. See, e.g., VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 801 (holding that the court “recognize[d] that
some of the characteristics of obscenity that warrant its regulation also characterize
nonconsensual pornography” but the court takes its “cues from the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to expand the scope of obscenity on the basis of a purpose-based analysis.”).
See also Brown, 564 U.S. at 794 (rejecting “shoehorn speech about violence into
obscenity.”).
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exception for nonconsensual pornography. Nonconsensual pornography
is thought to be “a strong candidate for categorical exclusion from full
First Amendment protection” by state courts and legal scholars alike. 100
While the United States Supreme Court has shown reluctance in declaring
new categorical exceptions to full First Amendment protection, it
nonetheless recognized that there may be “categories of speech that have
been historically unprotected, but have not been specifically identified or
discussed as such in our case law.”101 However, at this time, multiple state
courts have declined to create a new categorical First Amendment
exception without guidance from the Supreme Court.102

B. Scrutiny Analysis
The Indiana Supreme Court also had the option to analyze Indiana’s
statute using a scrutiny analysis. This is appropriate if the court concludes
that the speech which Indiana’s revenge porn statute regulates is
deserving of First Amendment protection. Under First Amendment
scrutiny analysis, the Indiana Supreme Court would first determine if
Indiana’s revenge porn statute is content-neutral or content-based.103
Then, based on this determination, the Indiana Supreme Court would
know the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply.
In the case that was before the Indiana Supreme Court, Katz, the
State and Katz argued, both by brief and oral argument, for the Indiana
Supreme Court to apply a scrutiny analysis.104 However, each side
100. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶43, 155 N.E.3d at 455 (quoting VanBuren, 214 A.3d
at 802); accord Ribot, supra note 71, at 536-37 (explaining that the United State
Supreme Court should create a new categorical exception for nonconsensual
pornography); Cohen, supra note 59, at 346-47 (concluding that nonconsensual
pornography should not be protected speech under the First Amendment).
101. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (“Our decision in Ferber
and other cases cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling authority to declare
new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment. Maybe there are
some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet
been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law. But if so, there is no
evidence that ‘depictions of animal cruelty’ is among them.”).
102. See e.g., VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 802 (explaining “although many of the State’s
arguments support the proposition that the speech at issue in this case does not enjoy
full First Amendment protection, we decline to identify a new categorical exclusion
from the full protections of the First Amendment when the Supreme Court has not
addressed the question.”); Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶43, 155 N.E.3d at 455 (holding the
court “decline[d] to identify a new categorical first amendment exception when the
United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question.”).
103. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642 (demonstrating that when speech falls
outside of the “well-understood exceptions” different levels of scrutiny apply based on
whether the regulation is content-neutral or content-based and thus this must be
determined before a level of scrutiny may be applied).
104. See generally Brief for the Appellant, supra note 5, at 27-38 (arguing scrutiny
analysis); Brief for the Appellee at 23-34, Indiana v. Conner Katz, No. 20S-CR-00632
(Ind. filed Nov. 4, 2020) (arguing scrutiny analysis); Oral Argument, Indiana v. Katz,
No.
20S-CR-00632
(Ind.
argued
June
24,
2021),
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advocated for a different level of scrutiny to be applied.105 The following
subsections will cover the two levels of scrutiny available to the Indiana
Supreme Court, as argued by the State and Katz.
1.

Intermediate Scrutiny

Intermediate scrutiny is to be applied to a statute when the statute’s
regulation of speech is content-neutral.106 Government regulation of
speech is content-neutral when the restriction is justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.107 In Katz, the State
argued that Indiana’s revenge porn statute is content-neutral, and thus
intermediate scrutiny should be applied.
In support of its argument, the State relied heavily on the Illinois
Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Austin108.109 In Austin, the Illinois
Supreme Court held Illinois’s revenge porn statute was subject to
intermediate scrutiny because the statute was a time, place, and manner
restriction justified by privacy concerns.110 Looking at the language of the
statute,111 the Austin court determined that the regulation of this speech
mycourts.in.gov/arguments/default.aspx?&id=2565&view=detail [perma.cc/QJY3VUF7] (arguing scrutiny analysis before the Indiana Supreme Court) [hereinafter Katz
Oral Argument].
105. Compare Brief for the Appellant, supra note 5, at 29-31 (arguing for the
Indiana Supreme Court to apply an intermediate scrutiny analysis), with Brief for the
Appellee, supra note 104, at 27-32 (arguing for the Indiana Supreme Court to apply a
strict scrutiny analysis).
106. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 662.
107. Id.
108. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶1 155 N.E.3d at 439. In Austin, the defendant was
charged under Illinois’s nonconsensual pornography statute, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/11-23.5(b) (West 2015), after she distributed nude pictures of the victim without
consent. Id. An Illinois circuit court initially dismissed the charge and concluded that
Illinois’s nonconsensual pornography statute was “facially unconstitutional as an
impermissible restriction on the right to free speech as guaranteed by the United
States and Illinois Constitutions.” Id. The State then filed a direct appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court challenging the lower court’s ruling. Id. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme
Court conducted a review of Illinois’s nonconsensual pornography statute under an
intermediate scrutiny analysis. Id. at 459. After a careful review of the statute’s
language, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that Illinois’s nonconsensual
pornography statute survived intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 459-66. Ultimately, the
Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lowered court’s decision and held Illinois’s
nonconsensual pornography statute to be constitutional. Id. at 474.
109. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 5, at 9.
110. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶49-50, 155 N.E.3d at 457-58.
111. The language that Illinois looked to is contained in 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/11-23.5(b) (West 2015) and reads as follows:
(b) A person commits non-consensual dissemination of private sexual images
when he or she:
(1) intentionally disseminates an image of another person:
(A) who is at least 18 years of age; and
(B) who is identifiable from the image itself or information displayed in
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was not based on the content of the image, but instead on “[t]he manner
of the image’s acquisition and publication.”112 The Austin court further
reasoned that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate because the statute
governed a purely private matter and thus did not pose any dangers to
one’s freedom of expression.113 As it stands, the Austin court is the only
state court to have analyzed a nonconsensual pornography statute under
this lower level of scrutiny.114
The State in Katz followed the Austin court’s analysis with respect to
content-neutrality.115 The State argued that Indiana’s revenge porn
statute is analogous to the Illinois statute, in that it criminalizes the
distribution of images sent without consent.116 However, the State argued
that the same image distributed with consent “fall[s] outside the purview
of the distribution statute.”117 Turning to the State’s privacy argument,
the State asked the court to take a “nuanced” approach. 118 The State
suggested that the Indiana Supreme Court need not even get to the
content-neutrality analysis because a “threshold inquiry” allows purely
private matters to be analyzed under intermediate scrutiny. 119 Notably,
no state high court has “taken this precise path.”120
If the Indiana Supreme Court found that Indiana’s statute was
content-neutral, the court would then determine whether the statute
could survive under intermediate scrutiny. “Generally, to survive
intermediate scrutiny, the law must serve an important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech” and
“must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest without unnecessarily
interfering with the first amendment freedoms.”121
The State in Katz argued that Indiana’s revenge porn statute can
connection with the image; and
(C) who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed,
in whole or in part; and
(2) obtains the image under circumstances in which a reasonable person
would know or understand that the image was to remain private; and
(3) knows or should have known that the person in the image has not
consented to the dissemination.
112. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶49-50, 155 N.E.3d at 457-58.
113. Id. at 53.
114. Katz Oral Argument, supra note 104, at 4:30-4:40. During the State’s oral
argument in Katz, Indiana Supreme Court Chief Justice Loretta H. Rush emphasized
that only one court, the Illinois Supreme Court in Austin, has applied intermediate
scrutiny to its nonconsensual pornography statute while the rest of state courts have
reviewed their nonconsensual pornography statutes under strict scrutiny.
115. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 5, at 29-34.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Katz Oral Argument, supra note 104, at 5:57-6:10.
119. Id. at 3:30-4:00.
120. Id. at 6:10-6:15.
121. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶59, 155 N.E.3d at 459 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.,
512 U.S. at 662).
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survive under this standard.122 Conversely, Katz argued that it cannot.123
If the Indiana Supreme Court had applied intermediate scrutiny analysis
to Indiana’s revenge porn statute, the court would have had to carefully
review the language of Indiana’s statute, and the speech it regulates, to
determine if it can survive this test.
2.

Strict Scrutiny

The Indiana Supreme Court also had the option to analyze Indiana’s
revenge porn statute under a strict scrutiny analysis. Strict scrutiny is
applied to content-based government regulations. “Government
regulation of speech is content-based if a law applies to particular speech
because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” 124 Katz
argued that Indiana’s revenge porn statute is “content based on its face”
and thus a heightened level of scrutiny is justified.125
In support of his argument, Katz encouraged the Indiana Supreme
Court to follow the majority of state courts who have applied this
heightened level of scrutiny to their nonconsensual pornography
statutes.126 To illustrate, in Ex parte Ellis127 a Texas court applied a strict
scrutiny analysis to the state’s revenge porn statute.128 The court’s
decision to apply strict scrutiny came after reviewing the Texas statute’s
language129 and determining that the statute “on its face” drew
122. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 5, at 31-33.
123. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 104, at 8.
124. Reed, 576 U.S. at 163.
125. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 104, at 25-26.
126. Id.
127. Ellis, 609 S.W.3d at 332. In Ellis, the defendant was charged under Texas’
nonconsensual pornography statute, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §21.16 (West 2019). Ellis
then “filed an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus arguing that Section 21.16(b)
[was] unconstitutional on its face.” Id. at 335. “The trial court denied relief.” Id. Ellis
subsequently filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals of Texas, Waco. Id. In reviewing
Texas’s nonconsensual pornography statute, the Ellis court determined that the statute
was a content-based restriction and thus a strict scrutiny analysis was warranted. Id.
at 336-37. The court then reviewed the language of Texas’s statute to ensure that the
speech it regulated was “(1) necessary to serve a (2) compelling state interest and (3)
narrowly drawn.” Id. at 337. Ultimately, the court concluded that Texas’ nonconsensual
pornography statute could survive this heightened level of scrutiny. Id. at 338.
Consequently, the Ellis court affirmed the lower court’s decision agreeing that Texas’
nonconsensual pornography statute was in fact constitutional. Id. at 339.
128. Id. at 336-38.
129. The language which Texas looked to is contained in TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§21.16 (West 2019) and reads as follows:
(b) A person commits an offense if:
(1) without the effective consent of the depicted person and with the intent
to harm that person, the person discloses visual material depicting another
person with the person's intimate parts exposed or engaged in sexual
conduct;
(2) at the time of the disclosure, the person knows or has reason to believe
that the visual material was obtained by the person or created under
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distinctions based on the message the speaker conveyed.130 “The statute
defines speech based upon the subject matter, intimate images, and also
restricts speech based upon its function and purpose, causing harm.” 131
The Ellis court further explained that the Texas law made it necessary to
look at the content of the speech when determining whether the speaker
violated the law.132
Katz’s argument before the Indiana Supreme Court was analogous
to the court’s ruling in Ellis. Katz argued that Indiana’s revenge porn
statute is in fact content-based because “the content of the image is
critical to its application.”133 Katz further argued that Indiana’s statute
“does not criminalize the non-consensual distribution of all private
images, but only ‘intimate’ images that depict sexual intercourse, sexual
conduct, or nudity.”134
If Indiana’s revenge porn statute is content-based, the court would
then have to determine if it can survive strict scrutiny analysis. To survive
strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the speech restrictions
within the statute are “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.”135 Furthermore, the Indiana Supreme Court must find that
there are no less restrictive means to serve the government’s purpose. 136
In Katz, the State and Katz have opposing views as to whether
Indiana’s revenge porn statute would survive under this heightened level
of scrutiny.137 The State argued that Indiana’s statute will survive,
because there is both a compelling interest and the statute is narrowly
tailored.138 Conversely, Katz argued the statute will fail because while
there is a compelling interest, Indiana’s revenge porn statute is not
“narrowly drawn to protect individuals from social consequences” and
thus there were ways in which the Legislature could have further
circumstances in which the depicted person had a reasonable expectation
that the visual material would remain private;
(3) the disclosure of the visual material causes harm to the depicted person;
and
(4) the disclosure of the visual material reveals the identity of the depicted
person in any manner, including through:
(A) any accompanying or subsequent information or material related to
the visual material; or
(B) information or material provided by a third party in response to the
disclosure of the visual material.
130. Ellis, 609 S.W.3d at 337.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 104, at 26.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Compare Brief for the Appellee, supra note 104, at 32, with Brief for the
Appellant, supra note 5, at 34.
138. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 5, at 34, 36.
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narrowed the statute.139
The Indiana Supreme Court ultimately elected to apply strict
scrutiny analysis to Indiana’s revenge porn statute.140 Therefore, the
Indiana Supreme Court was subsequently tasked with carefully reviewing
Indiana’s revenge porn statute and determining whether the statute
regulates speech in a manner allowable under the strict scrutiny test.

IV.

PROPOSAL

As demonstrated by the above section, revenge porn statutes pose
unique First Amendment challenges for courts. Without guidance from
the United States Supreme Court, state courts are forced to make their
own decisions regarding the appropriate First Amendment analysis to
apply to their respective statutes. This has led to a lack of uniformity
across state courts and a difficulty predicting which approach any given
state court may take when analyzing a First Amendment challenge to
their statute.141 As previously noted, the Indiana Supreme Court
ultimately analyzed Indiana’s revenge porn statute under a strict scrutiny
analysis.142 Given the speech which Indiana’s statute regulates, this was
the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. The following subsections will
explain why the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision was correct and how,
even under this heightened level of scrutiny, Indiana’s revenge porn
statute can survive constitutional muster.

A. Why Scrutiny Analysis?
When analyzing Indiana’s revenge porn statute, the Indiana
Supreme Court was correct in applying a scrutiny analysis. Scrutiny
analysis is appropriate when the regulated speech falls outside of a
categorical exception and thus receives full First Amendment
protection.143 The speech which revenge porn statutes regulate does not
139. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 104, at 28.
140. Katz, 179 N.E.3d at 455 (determining that Indiana’s distribution statute is
“plainly a content-based restriction” and thus is valid only if it passes strict scrutiny
analysis).
141. Compare VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 800-01, 807-814 (applying strict scrutiny
analysis to Vermont’s revenge porn statute and acknowledging the arguments for
categorical exceptions), and Ellis, 609 S.W.3d at 336-37 (holding Texas’s
nonconsensual pornography statute is content-based and thus deserving of strict
scrutiny analysis), and Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 641 (applying strict scrutiny analysis to
Minnesota’s nonconsensual pornography statute), with Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶43,
155 N.E.3d at 457 (holding Illinois’s nonconsensual pornography statute is subject to
intermediate scrutiny analysis and addressing categorical exceptions). See also Franks,
supra note 22, at 1312 (explaining “[i]t is difficult to say with confidence what any
court will do when faced with a question about the constitutionality of a given
nonconsensual pornography statute.”).
142. Katz, 179 N.E.3d at 451-56.
143. Well-known categorical exceptions to full First Amendment protection
include: speech which incites imminent lawless action, obscenity, defamation, fighting
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fall squarely into any existing categorical exception. 144 Thus, for the
Indiana Supreme Court to apply a categorical exception to Indiana’s
statute, the court would have been required to either expand an existing
categorical exception or create a new one.145 As state courts and legal
scholars alike have pointed out, there is an array of policy reasons to
support revenge porn receiving its own categorical exception. 146
However, the Indiana Supreme Court correctly noted that it would be
inappropriate for the Indiana Supreme Court to “step ahead” of the United
States Supreme Court.147 This is especially true given the United States
Supreme Court’s notable hesitation in expanding and creating new
categorical exceptions.148 Therefore, because revenge porn does not fit
within an existing categorical exception, the Indiana Supreme Court
correctly chose to analyze Indiana’s revenge porn statute under scrutiny
analysis.

B. What Level of Scrutiny – Intermediate or Strict?
Before the Indiana Supreme Court could apply a scrutiny analysis to
Indiana’s revenge porn statute, the court first had to determine the
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply, intermediate or strict. The court’s
decision turns on whether the court finds the statute to be content-based
or content-neutral. This issue was heavily litigated in Katz in both briefs
and oral arguments of Appellant and Appellee.
Again, looking to the decisions of other state courts, a majority have
determined that their respective revenge porn statutes are content-

words, child pornography, true threats, and speech presenting grave and imminent
threat which the government has the power to protect. U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709,
717 (2012).
144. Supra, discussion, section III.A.1 (analyzing why revenge porn does not fit
within a pre-existing categorical exception).
145. Supra, discussion, section III.A.2 (analyzing why revenge porn would need its
own categorical exception, or an expansion of a pre-existing categorical exception).
146. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶43, 155 N.E.3d at 455 (quoting VanBuren, 214 A.3d
at 802); accord Ribot, supra note 71, at 536-37 (explaining that the United States
Supreme Court should create a new categorical exception for nonconsensual
pornography); Cohen, supra note 59, at 346-47 (concluding that nonconsensual
pornography should not be protected speech under the First Amendment).
147. Katz, 179 N.E.3d at 453-54 (“This Court ‘leave[s] it to the Supreme Court in
the first instance to designate nonconsensual pornography as a new category of speech
that falls outside the First Amendment protections.’”) (quoting VanBuren, 214 A.3d at
807). See also Ribot, supra note 71, at 536 (explaining that Vermont and Texas state
courts have been “rightly reluctant to step ahead of the Supreme Court” when it comes
to creating a new categorical exception for revenge porn and provided detailed
analysis as to why a categorical exception for revenge porn should be created).
148. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472 (demonstrating that the United States Supreme
Court refused to create a First Amendment categorical exception for depictions of
animal cruelty).
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based.149 In fact, only one, Illinois in Austin, has determined otherwise.150
When analyzing revenge porn statutes, state courts look to the language
of the statutes to determine if the speech regulated is determinate on the
content or the message the speaker conveyed.151 The Indiana Supreme
Court followed this same analysis.152
In reviewing Indiana’s revenge porn statute, the Indiana Supreme
Court correctly held that Indiana’s statute is a content-based
regulation.153 Indiana’s revenge porn statute criminalizes the
nonconsensual distribution of “intimate images.”154 The statute defines
intimate images to mean a “photograph, digital image, or video” that
depicts “(A) sexual intercourse; (B) other sexual conduct (as defined in
Ind. Code 35-31/5-2-221.5155); or (C) exhibition of the uncovered
buttocks, genitals, or female breast.”156 Thus, the content of the image is
at the heart of the statute’s application. Without looking to the content of
the images, one would be unable to determine if the statute applied.
Because the application of Indiana’s statute heavily relies on the content
of the images, strict scrutiny is the correct level of analysis to apply.

C. Applying Strict Scrutiny Analysis to Indiana’s Revenge
Porn Statute
For Indiana’s revenge porn statute to survive strict scrutiny, the
statute must be “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” 157
In applying this heightened standard to Indiana’s revenge porn statute,
the statute is able to meet these stringent demands. Therefore, the
Indiana Supreme Court was correct in holding Indiana’s revenge porn
149. See, e.g., VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 800-01, 807-814 (applying strict scrutiny
analysis to Vermont’s revenge porn statute because it was determined to be a contentbased regulation); Ellis, 609 S.W.3d at 336-37 (holding Texas’s nonconsensual
pornography statute is content-based and thus deserving of strict scrutiny analysis).
150. See Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶46, 155 N.E.3d at 457 (holding Illinois’s
nonconsensual pornography statute is subject to an intermediate scrutiny analysis
because the statute is a content neutral time, place, and manner restriction).
151. See Ellis, 609 S.W.3d at 336-37 (applying a thorough analysis of Texas’s
revenge porn statute to determine if the statute was content-neutral or contentbased).
152. Katz, 179 N.E.3d at 455 (analyzing whether Indiana’s revenge porn statute
was content-neutral or content-based).
153. See id. (holding that Indiana’s revenge porn statute “on its face” “draws
distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.”).
154. IND. CODE §35-45-4-8.
155. See IND. CODE §35-31.5-2-221.5 (defining “other sexual conduct” to mean “an
act involving: (1) a sex organ of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of another
person; or (2) the penetration of the sex organ or anus of a person by an object. . .”)
(internal quotations omitted).
156. IND. CODE §35-45-4-8.
157. Reed, 576 U.S. at 163 (“Content-based laws—those that target speech based
on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be
justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.”).
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statute constitutional.158
1.

Does Indiana Have a Compelling Interest?

To begin the strict scrutiny analysis, one starts with the compelling
state interest. The state “must identify an ‘actual problem’ in need of
solving.”159 Indiana has a compelling state interest in regulating the
nonconsensual distribution of intimate images due to the privacy
concerns that such distribution presents. Privacy rights are “plainly
rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society.” 160
Privacy constitutes a compelling state interest when the privacy interest
is substantial, and the invasion occurs in an intolerable manner. 161
Indiana has a clear argument that the criminalization of
nonconsensual pornography serves to protect its residents and their
privacy. In fact, the argument is so clear that the Appellee in Katz actually
conceded this point.162 Furthermore, every state court who has addressed
this issue held the same way, finding that states have a compelling state
interest in protecting a person’s privacy and thus prohibiting intimate
images from being shared without consent.163
Additionally, “it is difficult to imagine something more private than
images of an individual engaging in sexual conduct, or of a person’s
genitals, anus, or pubic area, that the person has not consented to publicly
sharing.”164 It is not uncommon for victims to have personal information
shared along with these intimate images intensifying the privacy
concerns and harm to the victims.165 Clearly, the Indiana legislatures
understood these harms and the compelling state interest in protecting
Indiana residents when they proposed the law and subsequently passed
Indiana’s revenge porn statute. Further, the speech which Indiana’s
revenge porn statute regulates is only regulated in furtherance of
protecting these compelling state interests.
158. Katz, 179 N.E.3d at 460.
159. Id. at 456 (quoting Playboy, 529 U.S. 803, 822-23 (2000)).
160. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989).
161. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459 (2011).
162. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 104, at 27.
163. See, e.g., Ellis, 609 S.W.3d at 338 (holding that privacy is a “compelling
government interest when the privacy interest is substantial and occurs in an
intolerable manner” such as the disclosure of intimate material without consent);
People v. Iniguez, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 237, 243 (Cal. Super. App. Dept. 2016) (explaining
that the government has an interest in protecting the “substantial privacy interests of
individuals from being invaded in an intolerable manner”); VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 80001 (acknowledging that the state’s interest in the case focuses on “protecting the
privacy, safety, and integrity of the victim subject to nonconsensual public
dissemination of highly private images”); Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 638 (addressing the
developments in law and society which may merit a “reevaluation of privacy interests
within the context of the First Amendment.”).
164. VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 810.
165. Minc & Arko, supra note 35.
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Is Indiana’s Statute Narrowly Tailored?

Indiana’s revenge porn statute is also narrowly tailored to serve the
compelling state interest. Meaning, it is the “least restrictive means for
addressing the government’s interest.”166 To begin, subsection (a) of
Indiana’s statute, clearly lays out four exceptions in which the statute
would not apply.167 These exceptions include when explicit images are
distributed: “(1) to report a possible criminal act; (2) in connection with
a criminal investigation; (3) under a court order; or (4) to a location that
is (A) intended solely for the storage or back up of personal data,
including photographs, digital images, and video; and (B) password
protected.”168 The statute lays out these exceptions to narrowly tailor the
regulation to only matters that align with the State’s interest, the concern
for privacy and harm to Hoosiers.
Next, in subsections (b) and (c), the statute narrowly defines the
language used. First, subsection (b) defines “distribute” to mean
transferring to another “by means of, any medium, forum
telecommunications device or network, or Internet website” which
includes posting on the Internet or an application.169 Therefore, this
subsection limits what constitutes distribution and thus when the statute
may be applicable.
Further, subsection (c) defines “intimate image” to include only
“photographs, digital images, or video” that depict sexual intercourse,
other sexual conduct (as defined by Ind. Code 35-31.5-2-221.5), or
"exhibition of the uncovered buttocks, genitals, or female breast of an
individual.”170 By narrowly defining an intimate image, Indiana has
tailored the statute so that only images meeting these exact definitions
would be protected. Indiana’s statute is not so broad as to regulate a wide
array of constitutionally protected speech. Instead, the statute leaves a
wide range of speech unregulated and only focuses on a very specific
group of images which present privacy concerns and harm to Indiana
residents. Continuing with subsection (c), the statute states that only
individuals who receive the image from the subject of the images, or
individuals in the physical presence of the subject of the image may face
criminal liability.171 Therefore, this subsection limits the statute’s
166. Katz, 179 N.E.3d at 458 (quoting Playboy, 529 U.S. 803 at 827) (internal
quotations omitted).
167. IND. CODE §35-45-4-8.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. (Indiana’s revenge porn statute states that it is applicable to when the
intimate images is “taken, captured, or recorded by: (A) an individual depicted in the
photograph, digital image, or video and given or transmitted directly to the person
described in subsection (d); or (B) the person described in subsection (d) in the
physical presence of an individual depicted in the photograph, digital image, or
video.”).
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applicability so that unknowing third parties cannot face criminal
prosecution.
Turning to subsection (d), this section further restricts to whom
Indiana’s revenge porn statute applies. That is, any individual who
“knows or reasonably should know that an individual depicted in an
intimate image does not consent to the distribution of the intimate image;
and distributes the intimate image.”172 Thus, for a person to be criminally
liable, the government must prove “a defendant’s reasonable awareness
of the lack of consent to distribute.”173 This standard is not particularly
easy for a state to meet and further proves that the statute is narrowly
tailored. The state must prove, under a heavy burden, that a reasonable
person would have known there was no consent. Consequently,
individuals who participate in a voluntary exchange of intimate images
with consent are not included in this statute.
Taking all these requirements into consideration, it is clear that
Indiana has narrowly crafted its revenge porn statute to apply only in
very specific situations. Primarily, in the situations where there is a
heightened risk of harm to victims and where privacy is of the utmost
concern. Because Indiana’s revenge porn statute can survive strict
scrutiny, the statute is in fact constitutional. Thus, the Indiana Supreme
Court was correct in its holding.

V.

CONCLUSION

The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision regarding the
constitutionality of Indiana’s revenge porn statute is not only important
for all Hoosiers, but for the entire legal community. Revenge porn is not
going away. Instead, it will continue to grow with technology and social
media. While revenge porn statutes pose First Amendment challenges,
they are necessary to protect the safety and privacy of citizens across the
country. Further, the First Amendment challenges posed by revenge porn
statutes would ideally be resolved by revenge porn receiving its own
categorical exception to full First Amendment protection. However, the
legal community is still waiting for guidance from the United States
Supreme Court on that issue. Without that guidance, the Indiana Supreme
Court was proper in reviewing Indiana’s revenge porn statute under a
strict scrutiny analysis and ultimately holding that it is constitutional.

172. Id.
173. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 5, at 38.
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